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Manhattan
Cass R. Sunstein*
WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
There is a remarkable difference between television in 1961, when
1
Newton Minow delivered his great “Vast Wasteland” speech, and
television in the current era. The difference is the increase in the number of
channels. When Minow spoke, most Americans only had access to three or
four stations. The big networks monopolized the system. In the modern era,
most Americans have cable television, and this means that most Americans
have access to about 100 or more stations. Indeed, many Americans have
access to DIRECTV, which means that they have access to more than 500
stations. No one knows what innovations the future will bring, but it is
clear that scarcity is a decreasing problem. Let us suppose, plausibly, that
for the overwhelming majority of Americans, television will contain an
extraordinarily wide range of options in the near future.
Certainly it is still possible to describe the fare of particular
broadcasters and stations, on particular days, as a kind of wasteland. But it
would not be possible to describe television in this way. In the modern era,
television is much less like a wasteland and much more like Manhattan, in
the sense that it contains an astonishingly wide range of options, suitable
for many tastes. Those who want to see the news can watch the news all
day, and on more than one channel (and C-SPAN is hardly a wasteland).
Those who want to learn about history can watch The History Channel (not
a wasteland in the least). Those interested in animals can watch Animal
Planet (very far from a wasteland). Nor are children left out: the Disney

* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
1. Newton N. Minow, Television and the Public Interest, Speech Before the National
Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961).
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Channel offers high-quality fare for children; so too does Nickelodeon. For
consumers and citizens, what would seem to matter is the overall package
and option set, not the offerings of a particular broadcaster. Does the idea
of a “vast wasteland” have relevance today?
Consider an analogy: magazines. Many magazines are extremely low
quality. They offer their readers little or nothing. Taken by themselves,
they are not-so-vast wastelands. But the world of magazines is
exceptionally diverse, with large differences in topics, points of view,
seriousness, and quality. The world of television is not entirely different.
Channel 71 might be akin to People, or occasionally even The National
Enquirer, but channel 44 might be like National Geographic. Is this a
problem? Or consider the more recent analogy of Internet Web sites. Many
Web sites are a wasteland or worse; but the Internet is no wasteland.
Television does not offer anything like the range of possibilities afforded
by the Internet. But in its current incarnation, it is far closer to the Internet
than was its 1961 version. Would it not seem odd for a regulator to
complain that certain Web sites are wastelands if the overall package
contains numerous options and if many of them are good?
We can go further. The idea of analogies itself might be misleading.
The experiences of most people are not determined by any particular
technology. Few people learn, or find entertainment, from only one source.
Most people do not restrict themselves to magazines, or television, or the
Internet, or, for that matter, radio, movies, DVDs, books, or newspapers.
They tend to learn from, and to enjoy, some kind of mixture of all of these.
And if they emphasize one of the available possibilities, it is because that is
what they prefer. It might have been possible to express concern about the
content of television in an era of three or four stations and a far more
limited set of communications options. But in the modern era, people are
free to choose among countless possibilities.
In these circumstances, it might be sensible to ask: What’s the
problem? If television viewers end up seeing a wasteland, it is because that
is what they have chosen to see. In a free society, they are entitled to do
exactly that. Of course the interests of children, much emphasized by
Minow, cannot be entirely promoted by reference to choice. But parental
choices surely matter, and good programming can certainly, and
increasingly, be found for children as well. In short: Minow’s concerns
were relevant in 1961, simply because the options on television were so
limited, but today’s world is entirely different. Do his concerns have
continuing relevance? Do any concerns have relevance, or should we see
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the communications market as mostly well-functioning and free from any
need for substantive controls, or even moral suasion on those who provide
programming? Why not leave the market alone?

FRAGMENTATION
2

I am not certain how to answer these questions. But there are several
problems with the emerging situation. The first involves fragmentation—
not a problem for Minow in 1961, but for obvious reasons a problem for us.
To see this point, imagine that in a technological future, each person
could devise, with great precision, her own preferred communications
“menu”; imagine, in other words, that programming could be fully and not
just partially individuated. In such a system, people could filter in exactly
what they want, and filter out exactly what they do not want. Instead of
having channels 4, 5, and 7, or even 2 through 90, people would be able to
specify, on demand, exactly the programming that they wanted. If they
sought to include only news, and indeed only news dealing with the Middle
East, they would be able to do exactly that. If they wanted to see situation
comedies, or for that matter situation comedies dealing with the romantic
lives of people in their thirties, that would be feasible as well. If they
wanted to encounter congenial political perspectives, and only congenial
political perspectives, that would be possible too.
On the grounds favored by neoclassical economics, this would seem
to be a striking advance, a victory for both freedom and welfare. But it also
contains serious risks, above all because it may well result in a situation in
which many or most are not exposed to diverse topics and views, but
instead hear louder and louder echoes of their own preexisting
3
convictions. Like Minow, we should evaluate the system of
communications in democratic terms, and not simply from the standpoint
of neoclassical economics. And from the democratic point of view, one of
the advantages of a well-functioning system of communications is that it
supplies one or more genuinely public spheres. In those spheres, diverse
points of view are presented and confront one another, and are offered to
people who have a willingness to learn. And in those spheres, people
cannot monitor, in advance and with precision, the topics to which they are
exposed. In a way, the inability to monitor is irritating; but it is also a gain,
simply because it ensures that citizens will be able to see a range of topics
and perspectives.

2. Some discussion can be found in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
3. See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 2, for a detailed discussion.
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Compare this to the situation in which Minow spoke in 1961, when
general-interest broadcasters, newspapers, and magazines dominated the
scene. An advantage of the daily newspaper, Time, Newsweek, and ABC
World News Tonight is that typically they provide people with many
subjects and points of view. For a democracy, it is important to make
provisions for multiple forums of this kind. Of course I do not mean to
suggest that scarcity is better than numerous options. A system with
multiple channels, not to mention countless Web sites, offers countless
advantages. What I am suggesting is that if a large number of options
produces a great deal of fragmentation, real problems might arise, if only
4
because people will be living, in a sense, in “gated communities” in which
they do not encounter their fellow citizens.
If, for example, liberals are mostly hearing from liberals, and
conservatives mostly from conservatives, democratic deliberation will be
harder to undertake. Such deliberation requires an ability to have some
sympathetic understanding of the views of those with whom one disagrees,
and such an understanding cannot come from a system of gated
communications communities. Of course Manhattan has many
extraordinary virtues; but fragmentation is a problem with Manhattan, both
in its current form and as a model for communications.
5
Social science has underlined this point. It shows that when likeminded people speak only or mostly with one another, they tend to go to
extremes. More specifically, group polarization means that “members of a
deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the
6
direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies.” Thus, for
example, those who think that global warming is a serious problem are
likely, after group discussions, to think that global warming is an extremely
serious problem. Those who reject affirmative action are likely, after
talking with one another, to reject affirmative action with great vehemence.
Those who tend to support gun control are likely to do so with heightened
enthusiasm after talking together. By itself, these movements toward a
more extreme position may or may not be a problem. The difficulty arises
when a fragmented system of communications ensures that many people
will live in a set of “gated communities.”

4. This term refers to communities that are not geographically gated, but gated in the
sense that the people within speak, and listen, mostly to like-minded others.
5. See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 2, for an outline.
6. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE LAW OF GROUP POLARIZATION 3-4 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.,
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 91, 1999), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=199668.
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It is not inevitable that a wide range of options will be seen as a
problem here. Everything depends on what people actually choose. When
perspectives and topics are easy to find, people easily can get access to
opinions that diverge from their own. Fragmentation need not result. If
people seek out new topics and views, society may see convergence rather
than fragmentation. The problem will arise only if many people use the fact
of great variety as a reason to limit their own horizons, at least as compared
to a situation in which general-interest broadcasters provide an array of
opinions and subjects. I believe that we have reason to think that many
people are indeed using diverse options in this way and in many domains.
Notice that the word is “many,” not “most.” My only suggestion is that a
system of diverse options creates risks of its own; and that fragmentation is
among those risks.
I have noted that this was not Minow’s focus in his “Vast Wasteland”
speech, and for understandable reasons. But part of Minow’s emphasis was
on democracy; and if we emphasize democratic goals, we will be
concerned with fragmentation as well.

DEMOCRACY AND ASPIRATIONS
But these points about fragmentation do not go to the core of
Minow’s concerns. Minow seems to be urging, most generally, that
television is not best understood as an ordinary commodity, entirely subject
to the forces of supply and demand. He seems to think that those who run
important communications outlets should have aspirations that go beyond
people’s consumption choices. He seems to be concerned with the cultural
effects of television, and to think that even if broadcasters are catering to
people’s tastes, they might not be serving the public interest. Hence there is
a difference between the public interest and what interests the public. I
believe that on these counts, Minow was, and is, entirely right.
The American political tradition is committed to the ideal of
7
deliberative democracy, an ideal that has animated much First Amendment
doctrine and media regulation. If so, a system of communications might not
be ideal even if it provides exactly what consumers want. The question
remains whether democracy is served by that system. Even if the problem
of scarcity is conquered, and even if the media market is well functioning
from the economic point of view, it remains important to ask whether it
promotes a well-functioning system of democratic deliberation. This is so
especially in view of the importance of television to people’s judgments
7. See generally JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994).

OF
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about what issues are important and about what it is reasonable to think. If
television is to promote democracy, rather than the other way around, we
need to ask whether it is covering serious questions in a serious way, and
appealing to people’s best and most substantive sides. Consider, by way of
general orientation, John Dewey’s suggestion:
[W]hat is more significant is that counting of heads compels prior
recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion, while
the essence of appeal to force is to cut short resort to such methods.
Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it
with being. But it never is merely majority rule. . . . The important
consideration is that opportunity be given that idea to spread and to
become the possession of the multitude. . . . The essential need, in
other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of
9
debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.

The most important point is that a well-functioning market system
may fail to provide a system of communication that is well-adapted to a
democratic social order. Americans are entirely aware of this fact, whatever
they may choose in their capacity as viewers and listeners. Hence they
may, and sometimes do, seek collective corrections, in the form of financial
subsidies and regulations that might make the situation better rather than
worse.
In this sense, there is a pervasive difference between what people
want in their capacity as viewers (or “consumers of television”) and what
they want in their capacity as citizens, in which their aspirations sometimes
move to the fore. Minow was appealing, above all, to people’s role as
citizens. And a democratic public, engaged in deliberation about the world
of telecommunications, may legitimately seek a system embodying
aspirations that diverge from their consumption choices. When participants
in a democracy attempt to make things better, and do not simply track their
consumption choices, it is not helpful to disparage their efforts as
“paternalism” or as “meddling.” Their efforts at reform represent
democracy in action. It is hardly inappropriate for government to respond
to people’s aspirations and commitments as expressed in the public realm.
In any case, it seems clear that the public’s “tastes,” with respect to
television programming, do not come from nature or from the sky. They
are partly a product of current and recent practices by broadcasters and
other programmers. What people want, in short, is partly a product of what
they are accustomed to seeing. Tastes are formed, not just served, by
8. See generally SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS:
TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION (1987); SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE?
HOW TELEVISION FRAMES PUBLIC ISSUES 127-43 (1991).
9. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 207-08 (1927).
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broadcasters. In an era in which broadcasters are providing a good deal of
public interest programming, dealing with serious issues in a serious way,
many members of the public will cultivate a taste for that kind of
programming. This effect would promote democratic ideals by
10
disseminating information and helping to increase deliberation. In an era
in which broadcasters are carrying sensationalistic or violent material,
members of the public may well cultivate a taste for more of the same.
“Free marketeers have little to cheer about if all they can claim is that the
market is efficient at filling desires that the market itself creates. . . . Just as
11
culture affects preferences, so also do markets influence culture.” If this
is so, the economic ideal of “consumer sovereignty” is placed under some
pressure; market activities cannot easily be justified by reference to tastes
that they themselves generate.
I do not suggest that any particular reforms or regulations are justified
by these ideas. I urge only that democratic aspirations are a legitimate basis
for evaluating television and any other system of communications. The
point is fortified by the fact that such systems help form the various
preferences and values to which they cater. If this is so, it continues to
make sense to challenge those who provide television programming, in
order to urge that they do more and better for the viewing public. Taken as
a whole, television is hardly a wasteland. But much of it could be far better.
Too frequently, news coverage emphasizes sensationalistic charges, depicts
candidates in the crudest terms, and fails to engage substantive issues at all.
Increasingly impoverished political debate is yet another cost of our
current cultural trajectory. Complex modern societies generate
complex economic and social problems, and the task of choosing the
best course is difficult under the best of circumstances. And yet, as indepth analysis and commentary give way to sound bites in which rival
journalists and politicians mercilessly ravage one another, we become
12
an increasingly ill-informed and ill-tempered electorate.

Too often, programming consists of ludicrous situation comedies or
unimaginative “action” shows. Television, of course, is for relaxation and
entertainment as much as for anything else. But even when it is designed
for these purposes, it can be much better, as the best programming shows.

CONCLUSION
I have emphasized the largest difference between television in 1961
and television in the modern era: the astonishing increase in the range of
10. For evidence that the effects of television on this count are far from fanciful, see
IYENGAR, supra note 8, at 26-116.
11. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 201 (1995).
12. Id. at 203.
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options. This difference raises many questions about the continuing
relevance of Minow’s speech. Television is hardly a vast wasteland; it is
more like Manhattan. And even if there is too much wasteland on
television, the world of communications includes countless possibilities.
Many magazines are by themselves wastelands, but few would argue for a
“Federal Magazine Commission,” entrusted with the job of improving the
world of magazines as a whole. Many Web sites are worse than wastelands,
and some of them should be regulated; but there is no sufficient basis for a
“Federal Web Site Commission” with the mission of overseeing Web sites
on some kind of continuing basis.
Despite these points, Minow’s speech does seem to me to survive the
test of time, above all because of his emphasis on democratic goals and his
rejection of the idea that television should be evaluated in the terms used
for ordinary markets. I have mentioned the risk of fragmentation—not a
problem when Minow spoke, but a genuine risk today. And Minow’s
largest plea was for a conception of television that would cater to people’s
highest aspirations, not to their short-term preferences. By stressing those
aspirations, and the cultural consequences of programming, Minow was
able to urge that the public interest is different from what interests the
public. When large cities, like Manhattan, work well, it is not only because
they cater to the private interests of individual consumers; it is also because
they engage in a large set of civic enterprises that appeal to, and draw on,
the deepest commitments of their citizens. In the modern era, the same is
true of individual broadcasters and of television itself.

